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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12-104(15) (1993), 59-12-104(24)
(1993)1, Utah Admin. R. 865-19-85S and Utah Admin. R. 865-19-48S.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION MISCHARACTERIZED UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12104(15) AS A STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Page 2 of the Utah State Tax Commission's Brief (the Utah
State Tax Commission will be referred to as the "Commission" and
Mount Olympus Waters, Inc. will be referred to as "Mt. Olympus")
the last sentence of the section entitled "Standard of Review"
reads that Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) "specifically directs the
Tax Commission to define terms used within that section by rule."
Brief of Respondent — Appellee, at 2. We simply note in passing
that Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) as cited by the Commission has
nothing to do with the "Standard of Review," and therefore, should
not have been noted as a possible "Standard of Review."

x

The language in the statute at issue was added in 1987. In
1994, the Legislature amended the statute to eliminate the language
at issue. See 1991 H.B. 279, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "1". The new legislation contains no provision for
retroactive application and according to the Utah Constitution, the
new legislation is effective sixty days after the Legislature
adjourns. Utah Const. Art. VI § 25. Since the audit period at
issue herein is January 1, 1988 through December 31, 1990, the new
legislation does not apply to this appeal.
5

POINT II
UTAH ADMIN. R. 865-19-48S IS INVALID BECAUSE IT CONFLICTS
WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-104(24).
1.

Utah

Code

Ann.

S

59-12-104(24)

is

plain

and

unambiguous and the Court should not look beyond it to divine
legislative intent•
In two recent cases, this Court considered the necessity
of examining legislative intent with respect to the Commission's
interpretation of two sales tax exemptions.

In Miller Welding

Supply, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 361 (Utah App.
1993), Miller Welding developed an alternative method to deliver
oxygen to medically dependent individuals. The method involved the
use of a machine (concentrator) that concentrated oxygen from the
surrounding air and delivered it to the patient.

Miller Welding

sold the oxygen concentrators to patients without collecting sales
tax based on its interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(10).
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(10) contains a sales tax exemption for
"sales of medicine" and Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(4)(a)(i) defines
medicine to include "any oxygen or stoma supplies prescribed by a
physician."

The Commission audited Miller Welding and disagreed

with its interpretation and assessed sales tax on the sales of the
concentrators. Miller Welding filed a petition for redetermination
with the Commission and the Commission ruled that the exemption

6

does not apply. Even though the Court split on other issues, this
Court agreed that:
When
statutory
language
is plain and
unambiguous, we will not look beyond the
language to determine legislative intent,
(emphasis added).
Miller Welding, at 362.
The Court also agreed that:
A statute is ambiguous if it can be understood
by reasonably well-informed persons to have
different meanings.
Miller Welding, at 362.
In OSI Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860
P.2d

381

(Utah App. 1993), this Court again considered the

Commission's interpretation of a sales tax exemption. OSI operated
a meat processing plant that produces ground meat patties for sale
to McDonald's restaurants.

In order to preserve the required

quality, OSI sprayed liquid nitrogen on the patties. OSI purchased
the liquid nitrogen from various vendors without paying sales tax
based on its interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20).
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) contained a sales tax exemption for
"sprays

... used to control

... diseases

products or ... animal products."

... for commercial

The Commission audited OSI and

disagreed with OSI's interpretation and assessed sales tax on the
purchases

of

liquid

nitrogen.

OSI

filed

a

petition

for

redetermination with the Commission and the Commission ruled that
7

the liquid nitrogen purchased by OSI was not a "spray" and was not
used to control "diseases" as contemplated by the statute.

This

Court reasserted its holding in Miller Welding and said:
When
statutory
language
is plain
and
unambiguous, we do not look beyond the same to
divine
legislative
intent.
(citations
omitted)
. . .

Specifically,
we
will
not
interpret
unambiguous
language
in
a
statute
to
contradict its plain meaning.
(citations
omitted)
OSI Industries, at 383 and 384.
One of the issues in this appeal is the meaning of the
word "any" as used in the phrase "any container" that is found in
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(24).
a plain and unambiguous word.

The word "any" standing alone is
A reasonably well informed person

would not consider the word "any" to have different meanings.
Furthermore, adding the word "any" to the statute (where previously
the word was not part of the statute) , makes the phrase "any
container" even clearer.

When considering these two factors, a

reasonably well-informed person would not consider the phrase "any
container" to have different meanings.

Therefore, this Court

should not look beyond the statute to divine legislative intent and
should hold that Utah Admin. R. 865-19-48S is invalid because it
conflicts with Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(24).
8

2.

Even if the Court examines legislative intent, the

legislative intent is not clear.
Even

if

the Court

examines

legislative

history

to

determine legislative intent, the legislative intent is not clear.
The Commission relies on Dr. Brady for the proposition that the
Legislature did not intend to change previous tax policies.

Dr.

Brady said that "it is my understanding that the tax law will be
still read and interpreted the same after these tax bills are
passed as they are now."
15,

1987.

Recording at Senate Proceeding, January

However, Dr. Brady did not understand the prior

interpretation of the statute, as evidenced by his Committee's
recommendation to add the word
legislative enactment.

"any" to

"container"

in the

Adding the word "any" contradicts the

reusable and non-reusable distinction of the Commission's rules.
Obviously, Dr. Brady did not have a complete understanding of the
reusable and non-reusable distinction, nor the prior interpretation
of the statute.

Dr. Brady was confused and he confused the

legislature. Therefore, the legislative intent is not clear enough
to support the Commission's position, and this Court should hold
that Utah Admin. R. 865-19-48S is invalid.

9

3.

Interpreting "any" using its plain meaning would not

render the statute unreasonably confused or inoperable.
The Commission argues that a plain reading of the statute
would render the statute unreasonably confused and inoperable. The
Commission then invites the Court to imagine a visit to a retail
store where the value of the contents of containers are taxed but
not the container. To the contrary, Mt. Olympus suggests that this
Court imagine the results if it sustains the Commission's ruling.
Lawyers, judges, and businessmen would be required to divine
legislative intent contrary to the plain, unambiguous language of
the statute.

Words would not mean what they say.

The tax system

(and the entire legal system) would become inoperable because it
would be necessary to examine legislative intent even for the
clearest of statutes. Interpreting "any," using its plain meaning,
would not render the statute unreasonably confused or inoperable,
but just the opposite. Therefore, this Court should hold that Utah
Admin. R. 865-19-48S is invalid.
POINT III
THE COMMISSION MISINTERPRETED B.C. OLSEN CO. V. STATE TAX
COMMISSION.
The Commission misinterpreted the Utah Supreme Court's
analysis in E.C. Olsen v. State Tax Commission, 168 P.2d 324 (Utah
1946).

The Commission cited and quoted E.C. Olsen for the

proposition that the sales tax exemption for containers does not
10

apply to reusable containers.2 The Commission, however, failed to
recognize that the statute at issue in E.C. Olsen contained two
exemptions.

The first exemption was for personal property that

"became an ingredient or component part of the finished products."
Id. at 330. The second exemption was for the "container, labels or
shipping cases of what was being manufactured."

Jd. at 330. The

provision quoted by the Commission applies to the first exemption,
not the second exemption. The Court specifically held that the car
strips, picking boxes, pea canning trays and milk cases or boxes
are not "containers or labels or shipping cases within the means of
subdivision (f).H Id. at 330. The Court ruled on the "ingredient
or component part" portion of the statute

(not the container

portion). However, the Commission quotes E.C. Olsen to support its
argument

regarding

containers,

and

then

concludes

that

the

container exemption applies "only to containers which were sold to
and consumed by the consumer." Brief of Respondent — Appellee, at
12.

Within the same paragraph of the language quoted by the

Commission, the Court goes on to say:

2

The sales tax applicable in E.C. Olsen contained an exemption
for personal property "which enter[s] into and becomes an
ingredient or component part of the tangible personal property or
product which he manufactures, or compounds, or the container,
label or shipping case thereof." Emergency Revenue Act of 1933
[Sales Tax], L. 1933, Ch. 63, effective March 21, 1933, § 80-152(f).
11

The test is:
Are the articles involved
consumed by the processor as the last user?
If they are so consumed, the tax must be paid
thereon by the processor. On the other hand,
if the articles enter into and become an
ingredient or component part of what he
manufactures, and are thus passed on to the
final user or the articles are containers,
labels, or shipping cases of what he
manufactures, the processor does not pay the
tax. (emphasis added).
Id. at 330.
The

analysis

in

E.C.

Olsen

concerning

whether

a

particular item of personal property was used "over and over again"
is used to determine if the personal property became an ingredient
or component part of the finished product.

According to the

Supreme Court, if the personal property was to be used "over and
over again", it did not become an ingredient or component part of
the finished product and, therefore, not entitled to the first part
of the exemption. The Court's conclusion would apply to a shovel,
plow, ski lift or any other item of personal property.

The

Commission is confused because the E.C. Olsen picking boxes, pea
canning trays and milk cases or boxes were considered "containers"
in the generic sense, but were not containers of what was being
manufactured and, therefore, not entitled to the second part of the
exemption. Accordingly, in the case at bar, unlike E.C. Olsen, the
Mt. Olympus containers are the containers for what is manufactured.

12

Holding that Mt. Olympus is entitled to the container exemption is
consistent with the holding of E.C. Olsen v. State Tax Commission.
POINT IV
RULING THAT PASTEURIZATION REQUIRES HEAT PLACES AN
UNWARRANTED AND UNNECESSARY RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION ON THE
MANUFACTURING EXEMPTION.
The Commission

quoted Webster's

Dictionary

proposition that "pasteurization" requires heat.
Commission

failed

to

read

the

alternative

pasteurization from the same source.

for the

However, the
definition

of

Webster's New Collegiate

Dictionary (1981) also defines pasteurization as the:
2: partial sterilization of perishable food
products (as frost or fish) with radiation (as
gamma rays).
Webster recognizes a hi-tech pasteurization process which does not
require heat. The Commission failed to recognize the existence of
such process.

Ruling that pasteurization always requires heat

makes unwarranted use of an unnecessary restrictive definition in
a hi-tech world. Such an interpretation and zealous tax collection
runs counter to the purpose of the underlying statute and leaves
Utah years behind for the purpose of encouraging new applications
of recognized manufacturing processes. Drawings (Exhibits A, B and
C

at

the

Commission

hearing)

that

illustrate

the

hi-tech

pasteurization process used by Mt. Olympus are attached hereto as
Exhibit "2", "3" and "4".
13

POINT V
STATUTES SHOULD BE INTERPRETED WITH ENOUGH LATITUDE TO
ACCOMPLISH THE INTENDED PURPOSE.
The Commission correctly states the general rule that
exemptions are generally construed narrowly and then saysf among
other things, that the manufacturing exemption should be construed
narrowly.

However, the Commission failed to quote the entire rule

which states that exemptions should be construed with enough
latitude to accomplish the intended purpose.

In OSI Industries,

this Court stated:
Lastly, we note that although exemptions from
taxation are generally construed narrowly,
they should, nonetheless, be construed with
sufficient latitude to accomplish the intended
purpose. (citations omitted).
OSI Industries, at 385.
Following

that

directive, in the

present

case the

manufacturing exemption should be construed with enough latitude to
include the purchases presently at issue because the very exemption
was intended to encourage such tax exempt purchases.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mt. Olympus is entitled to the
statutory sales tax exemptions provided in Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12104(24) and 59-12-104(15). Accordingly, the Commission's decision
to the contrary should be reversed and all taxes paid by Mt.

14

Olympus in order to perfect this appeal should be refunded to Mt,
Olympus with interest.
Respectfully submitted this

£

day of April 1994.

JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
A Professional Corporation

By:
Kent A Zinebaugh
Johr*/N • Brems

15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the <7a

day of April 1994, I

caused copies of REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT to be served
by having the same hand delivered and left at the office of the
following with a clerk or other person in charge thereof:
Utah State Tax Commission
Heber M. Wells Building
160 E. Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing Division
Utah State Tax Commission
160 E. Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
Kim Thorne
Director, Auditing Division
Utah State Tax Commission
160 E. Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
Mark E. Wainwright
Assistant Attorney General
50 S. Main #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

JNB\P\069.8

16

EXHIBIT 1

SALES TAX - CONTAINER EXEMPTION
1994
GENERAL SESSION
Enrolled Copy
H. B. No. 279
AN ACT RELATING

By
TO

REVENUE

AND

TAXATION;

John L. Valentine
CLARIFYING

THE

SALES

TAX

EXEMPTION FOR CONTAINERS, LABELS, AND SHIPPING CASES.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDS:
59-12-104, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 166 AND 296, LAWS OF UTAH 1993
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1.

Section

59-12-104,

Utah

Code

Annotated 1953, as last

amended by Chapters 166 and 296, Laws of Utah 1993, is amended to read:
59-12-104.

Exemptions.

The following sales and uses are exempt from

the

taxes

imposed

by

this chapter:
(1)

sales

of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and special fuel subject to

a Utah state excise tax under Title 59, Chapter

13,

Motor

and

Special

Fuel Tax Act;
(2)

sales

to

the

state,

its

institutions,

and

its

political

subdivisions;
(3)

sales

of

food,

beverage,

and

machines in which the proceeds of each sale

dairy
do

products
not

exceed

from
$1

vending
if

the

vendor or operator of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 120%
of the cost of items as goods consumed;

H. B. No, 279

(4)
and

sales

related

of

food,

services

beverage, dairy products, similar confections,

to

commercial

airline

carriers

for

in-flight

consumption;
(5)

sales of parts and equipment installed in aircraft

operated

by

common carriers in interstate or foreign commerce;
(6)

sales

of

commercials,

motion picture films, prerecorded audio

program tapes or records, and prerecorded
distributor,

or

studio

to

video

tapes

by

a

producer,

a motion picture exhibitor, distributor, or

commercial television or radio broadcaster;
(7)

sales made through coin-operated laundry machines, coin-operated

dry cleaning machines, or coin-operated car washes;
(8)

sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions in

the

conduct of their regular religious or charitable functions and activities
and,

after

July 1, 1993, if the requirements of Section 59-12-104.1 are

fulfilled;
(9)

sales of vehicles of a type required to be registered under

the

motor vehicle laws of this state which are made to bona fide nonresidents
of

this

state

and

are not afterwards registered or used in this state

except as necessary to transport them to the borders of this state;
(10)

sales of medicine;

(11)

sales or use of

construction

of

property, materials, or services used

in

the

or incorporated in pollution control facilities allowed

by Sections 19-2-123 through 19-2-127;

-2-

H. B. No. 279

(12)
taxing

sales or use of property which the

under

state

is

prohibited

from

the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the

laws of this state;
(13)

sales of meals served by:

(a)

public elementary and secondary schools;

(b)

churches, charitable institutions, and

institutions

of

higher

education, if the meals are not available to the general public; and
(c)

inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing facilities;

(14)

isolated

or

occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged

in business, except the sale of vehicles or vessels required to be titled
or registered under the laws of this state;
(15)
by

a

sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased or

manufacturer

for

use

in

new or expanding operations (excluding

normal operating replacements, which includes replacement
equipment

leased

machinery

and

even though they may increase plant production or capacity, as

determined by the commission) in

any

manufacturing

facility

in

Utah.

Manufacturing facility means an establishment described in SIC Codes 2000
to

3999

of

the

1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of the

federal Executive Office of
Budget.

For

purposes

the

President,

Office

of

Management

of this subsection, the commission shall by rule

define "new or expanding operations11 and "establishment .ff
1991,

and

and

By October

1,

every five years thereafter, the commission shall review this

exemption and make recommendations to the Revenue

and

Taxation

Interim

Committee concerning whether the exemption should be continued, modified,

-3-

H. B. No. 279

or

repealed.

In

its

report

to

the

Revenue

and

Taxation

Interim

Committee, the tax commission review shall include at least:
(a)

the cost of the exemption;

(b)

the purpose and effectiveness of the exemption; and

(c)

the benefits of the exemption to the state;

(16)

sales

of

tooling,

special

tooling,

support

equipment, and

special test equipment used or consumed exclusively in the performance of
any aerospace or electronics industry contract

with

the

United

States

government or any subcontract under that contract, but only if, under the
terms of that contract or subcontract, title to the tooling and equipment
is

vested

in

the United States government as evidenced by a government

identification tag placed on the tooling and equipment or by listing on a
government-approved property record if a tag is impractical;
(17)

intrastate movements of freight and express or

street

railway

fares;

or

(18)

sales of newspapers or newspaper subscriptions;

(19)

tangible personal property, other than money, traded in as full

part

payment

of

the

purchase

price,

except that for purposes of

calculating sales or use tax upon vehicles not sold by a vehicle
trade-ins

are

dealer,

limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon

the then existing fair market value of the vehicle

being

sold

and

the

vehicle being traded in, as determined by the commission;
(20)

sprays

and insecticides used to control insects, diseases, and

weeds for commercial production of fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds,
animal products;

-4-

and

H. B. No. 279

(21)
and

sales

directly

of tangible personal property used or consumed primarily
in

farming

operations,

including

sales

of

irrigation

equipment and supplies used for agricultural production purposes, whether
or not they become part of real estate and whether or

not

installed

by

farmer, contractor, or subcontractor, but not sales of:
(a) machinery,

equipment,

materials, and supplies used in a manner

that is incidental to farming, such as hand tools with

a

unit

purchase

price not in excess of $100, and maintenance and janitorial equipment and
supplies;
(b)

tangible

personal

property

used

in any activities other than

farming, such as office equipment and supplies,
used

in

sales

or

distribution

of

farm

equipment

and

supplies

products, in research, or in

transportation; or
(c)

any vehicle required to be registered by the laws of this state,

without regard to the use to which the vehicle is put;
(22)

seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, or garden,

farm,

or

other agricultural produce if sold by the producer;
(23)

purchases of food made with food stamps;

(24)

[any—container7—tabefc7-sh±ppTng-case7-or7-±n-the-ease-o£-meat

or—meat—prodnetS7—any—easing]
nonreturnable

labels,

sales

of

for

use

processor,

wholesaler,

or

in packaging tangible personal property to be sold by

that manufacturer, processor, wholesaler, or retailer;
(25)

containers,

nonreturnable bags, nonreturnable shipping cases,

and nonreturnable casings to a manufacturer,
retailer

nonreturnable

property stored in the state for resale;

-5-

H. B. No. 279

(26)

property brought into the state by a nonresident for his or her

own personal use or enjoyment while within
purchased

the

state,

except

property

for use in Utah by a nonresident living and working in Utah at

the time of purchase;
(27)
course

property purchased for resale in this

of

business,

state,

in

the

regular

either in its original form or as an ingredient or

component part of a manufactured or compounded product;
(28)
state,

property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to

or

one

some

other

of its subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid

any difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by this part

and

Part 2, and no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater than the
tax imposed by this part and Part 2;
(29)

any

sale

of

a

service

described

in

Subsections 59-12-103

( 1 K b ) , (c), and (d) to a person for use in compounding a service taxable
under the subsections;
(30)

purchases of food made under the

WIC

program

of

the

United

States Department of Agriculture;
(31)

sales

or

leases

made after July 1, 1987, and before June 30,

1996, of rolls, rollers, refractory brick,
replacement

electric

motors,

and

other

parts used in the furnaces, mills, and ovens of a steel mill

described in SIC Code 3312 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification
Manual, of the federal Executive

Office

of

the

President,

Office

of

Management and Budget, but only if the steel mill was a nonproducing Utah
facility purchased and reopened for the production of steel;
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(32)

sales

of boats of a type required to be registered under Title

73, Chapter 18, State Boating Act, boat
which

are

made

to

bona

fide

thereafter registered or used

in

trailers,

nonresidents
this

and

outboard

motors

of this state and are not

state

except

as

necessary

to

transport them to the borders of this state;
(33)

sales

of

tangible

personal

property

state that is subsequently shipped outside
pursuant

to

contract

into

entity

state

and

incorporated

and becomes a part of real property located

outside of this state, except to the
political

the

to persons within this

extent

that

the

other

state

or

imposes a sales, use, gross receipts, or other similar

transaction excise tax on it against which the other state

or

political

entity allows a credit for taxes imposed by this chapter;
(34)
use

sales of aircraft manufactured in Utah if sold for delivery and

outside

Utah

where

a sales or use tax is not imposed, even if the

title is passed in Utah; and
(35)

until July 1, 1999, amounts

paid

for

purchase

service for purposes of providing telephone service.
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of
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